Hooves, Heels, and Wheels

Exploring historic places by horseback, foot and vehicle ...


Sunday, February 26, 2012

The Civil War: 150 Years Later -The Bickering Confederates / Balls Bluff


In this and subsequent special editions of Hooves, Heels and Wheels, the blog will take a look at the 150th anniversary of the events of the Civil War, and reflect on how they came about, and what implications they have for today ...
The Civil War

150 years ago This Winter : The Bickering Confederates/ Ball's Bluff

Autumn / Winter, 1861-1862



The Bickering Confederates

The new Union General, George B McClellan, was building and training a large army with painstaking care and dedication – perhaps too much, thought Union President Abraham Lincoln and the new Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. This training was taking up the entire last half of 1861, and McClellan had not informed anyone when exactly he planned on attacking the Confederates again.


If General McClellan is not using the army, I would like to borrow it, provided I could see how it could be made to do something" – President Abraham Lincoln.


Washington DC wasn’t the only city that housed a president annoyed with his generals. 100 miles to the south in Richmond, Jefferson Davis sat in his own White House – and butted heads with his own uniformed men.



Unlike Lincoln, Davis himself was a military man, an ex-soldier, a West Point graduate, a veteran of the Black Hawk and Mexican Wars, and a former US Secretary of War. With a resume like that, he preferred to be a far more hands-on commander-in-chief then Lincoln. His primary commanders, Generals Joseph Johnston and P.G.T Beauregard would frequently lock horns with him over this.

Knowing that McClellan’s Yankees were massing and training in peace and safety in Washington and Maryland, both McClellan and Beauregard advised a military strike into Northern territory. Davis forbade it, preferring that the South concentrate on a strictly defensive posture.

Davis did not take kindly to differing opinions. With Beauregard, his solution to avoiding disagreements was simple – ship Beauregard out west to commands in Tennessee and Mississippi. Joseph Johnston was a tougher opponent. He was generous and contentious of the welfare of his soldiers, and this made him very popular – to popular to simply fire for no good reason. Both Davis and Johnston were touchy and easily angered. A quarrel the two men had at the end of 1861 made it clear that the two of these men had problems that went far beyond clothing, feeding and leading the Confederate Army.




Of primary importance, of course, was how the Confederate Army was thwart the next Union invasion - which would inevitably come when winter broke and the weather warmed. The Confederate Army had been camped at Manassas for half a year now. Johnston didn’t want to fight another battle there, and wanted to give battle someplace closer to Richmond – but was unclear to Davis on the details of this important plan. As 1861 drew to a close, and the first winter of the war wore on, the Confederate high command was strained, in spite of victory.

Battle At Balls Bluff

A brief but brutal encounter in October gave the Confederates some cause for cheer – and highlighted the many deficiencies of the Union command. On October 21 1861 a task force of about 2000 Federals crossed the Potomac River near Ball’s Bluff, VA and attempted to oust what they believed to be a small force of Confederates from the nearby town of Leesburg.

This Union force ran into trouble from the start. The Confederate force was in fact around equal in size. This was bad news for the Yankee task force, as it was comprised entirely of rookies who were new to battle, and the Confederates were battle-toughened vets of the Manassas battle. The leadership reflected the experience of the forces. On the scene for the Confederates was Col. Nathan Evans, who had practically started the Battle of Manassas back in July. The Union force was led by Col. Edward Baker, who was almost as new to battle as his men.




The progress of the engagement followed the advantages. Baker’s deployments were unsound, and some of his men got in the ways of others. Baker also ignored key ground, and as a result the Confederate forces were able to press his unit on three sides. Late in the afternoon, Baker collapsed on the battlefield, riddled with six bullets from a Confederate revolver.

The Union attack had lost its leader, and now it lost all hope of success. When two Northern companies mistook a Confederate officer for one of their own, they accidently marched directly into the enemy battle line. The Union attack was doomed, and the force made one of the most tragic and harrowing retreats imaginable, trapped between the Confederates, and the steep precipice of Ball’s Bluff.



… Screams of pain and terror filled the air. Men seemed suddenly bereft of reason, they leaped over the bluff with muskets still in their clutch, threw themselves into the river without divesting themselves of their heavy accoutrements, hence went to the bottom like lead. Others sprang down upon the heads and bayonets of those below. A grey haired private was found with his head mashed between two rocks by the heavy boots of a ponderous Tammany man, who had broken his own neck by the fall! The side of the bluff was worn smooth by the number sliding down.” – Confederate soldier Randolph Shotwell

The Federal casualties for this misbegotten adventure were gut-wrenching. 49 men had been shot dead, but 100 more had drowned in the Potomac River while retreating. Almost 200 more had been wounded and a whopping 529 men had been captured. The damage to the Confederate forces was slight, with only about 150 killed or wounded. What was supposed to be a minor reconnaissance –in-force had become a Federal disaster that was half as bad as the major battle at Bull Run/Manassas had been. Criticism in the press was predictably severe.


History affords few examples of such slaughter”
– Harper’s Weekly

This time military incompetence must accept its own responsibilities. The battle was not a great military blunder, but a great military crime.”—Leslie’s Illustrated

Naturally, the Confederates were once more cheered by the lopsided victory, and this second routing of a Federal force. 1861 ended and 1862 began, and winter came and waned. 150 years ago this winter, American presidents, generals, soldiers and civilians read the news, watched the calendars, and minded the weather. 1862 would surely bring more violence and pain. Would it bring progress in the war? Would it be a year for victory or defeat for either side?

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