Remember Memorial Day

Happy Memorial Day, Historical Hikers!

For those with an interest in visiting historical places, Memorial Day holds a special, twofold significance.

Obviously, as the unofficial beginning of summertime, Memorial Day weekend is the time that all our favorite destinations are all on a summer schedule. Parks will be fully staffed and all the trails will be open by now. Hotels, restaurants, sporting goods stores, souvenir shops and yes, the tourist traps have been gearing up for this weekend, ready to receive tribute from tourists like ourselves.

Of far more significance however, is the meaning of Memorial Day. It is the day Americans reflect upon our fellow citizens who made the ultimate sacrifice in the defense of freedom and liberty. Nobody who makes history his or her hobby needs to be reminded of this. The sacrifice and courage of these men and women are the reasons why such places are preserved as tourist destinations.

The very first Americans to fall in defense of freedom did so on April 19th, 1775 in the small village of Lexington, Massachusetts. It was this small action that marked the beginning of the Revolutionary War. It was this war that marked the beginning of the United States a nation. It was the United States that marked the beginning of freedom, democracy, and the right to better oneself in the modern world.



Americans continue to face dangers to democracy to this very day and hour. In 1775 the threat came from British grenadiers enforcing the will of the despotic king. In 1861 the threat came from secessionists who wished to continue the evils of slavery indefinitely. In 1917 nationalistic belligerents from Germany and Austria-Hungary assailed American democracy. In 1941 Americans went to war to stop ruthless totalitarianism and genocide. For fifty years more, the menace came from communist aggression. Today the foe is terrorism and religious fanaticism.

The directions from which threats come may change over time, but the resolution of the US citizen-soldier to confront them has been constant. Without such courage and resolution there’d be no America.



We who visit historical buildings, parks and cemeteries such as Valley Forge, Guilford Courthouse, Fredericksburg, Andersonville, Arlington, and the Arizona Memorial do so to get a more intimate perspective to the hardship and sacrifice so many Americans endured to bequeath to us the free and beautiful nation we so love today.

Antietam National Battlefield -- Hiking Trail #2

Union Advance Trail - Attack and Defense of the Burnside Bridge

Antietam National Battlefield established this hiking trail for those visitors wishing to explore the terrain around Burnside Bridge. The trail covers the ground that the soldiers of the Union 9th Corps covered as they tried to capture the bridge. Capturing the bridge was a key step to the 9th Corps attack on the Confederate right. The Confederate positions are also examined at the trail's start.

The auto tour, of course presents an overview of the battle, but among all the tour stops on the auto tour, it is stops 9 and 10 that are most incomplete without exiting the car and walking around. Indeed, Burnside Bridge, one of the most iconic battlefield landmarks is not visible from the parking area of tour stop 9!

Civil War Traveler offers a free downloadable podcast, and the National Park Service sells a brochure with a trail map. The trail map is also available for download.


Podcast

http://www.civilwartraveler.com/audio/index.html

Map

http://www.nps.gov/anti/planyourvisit/hiking.htm

It should be noted that there are slight differences between the tour presented in the official National Park tour book and the podcast. In the book, Tour Stop 1 is on the other side of the bridge. It's officially marked with a post with a "1". The podcast on the other hand, makes the patio near the parking area the first stop, and makes the bridge itself the second stop. Tour Stop 1 in the book is Tour Stop 3 in the podcast. The tour thus continues with a "two stop" differential in the two tours. I'm going by the NPS tour markers, and I've added "A" and "B" at the beginning for the patio and bridge. The tour route is identical for both podcasts.

The trail spends most of its course following the ground involved during the Union attacks. Perhaps somewhat irritatingly the trail does not flow in chronological order. Rather, it takes us to the points involved in the first attack, then fourth, then second, and then third attack, before arriving back at the bridge.

The trail is a mile long, and generally easy, except for two hills. Wear good shoes, use a hiking staff, and watch the groundhog holes and poison ivy!


Trailhead Start

Hikers leave their car at the parking area, find the stone wall, and step onto the patio.

A- Confederate Patio

The patio provides a commanding view of the bridge below. The Confederates posted here, though few in numbers owned a clear terrain advantage. Not only did they have the high ground, but they also had tree cover, and ready-made rifle pits. In fact, these rifle pits still exist today. The pits were created years before the battle by the stones used to build the bridge. Little did the engineers and bridge builders know that in quarrying the stone to build the bridge, they’d be assisting Confederate troops trying to defend it! Walk up to the railing or wall and observe the rifle pits below.

All these advantages would prove necessary to the Confederates, because theirs was a formidable task. With the heavy fighting occurring on the northern end of the battlefield (The Cornfield, The Sunken Road), Confederate General Robert E. Lee had stripped away many of the solders from this end of his battle line, his right flank, to shore up his overwhelmed left flank. Only a skeletal force of brave Rebels stood between the Union 9th Corps, the town of Sharpsburg, and Potomac River fords, the capture of which would have surely spelled the end of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, and the Civil War.

Confederate Chain of Command
Confederate General James Longstreet was theoretically in charge of the right half of Lee’s line, but his influence on the events surrounding Burnside Bridge was small. Most of his command was in the northern part of the battlefield, assisting General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s half of the army. (Indeed, Longstreet’s and Jackson’s divisions were so overlapped, that figuring out whose division was occupying what ground is one of the more daunting challenges of touring this particular battlefield).

Only one of Longstreet’s divisions, under Gen. David R Jones was protecting the southern part of the town of Sharpsburg – the only division facing Burnside. To guard against the 9th Corps’ 12,000 federals, Jones only had 3,300 men in his lines.

Only one of Jones’ five small brigades was posted along the bluffs here along the creek. It was under the command of Gen. Robert Toombs. Toombs posted the 2nd Georgia on the left of this point, and the 20th Georgia on the right. The 50th Georgia was posted further to the south, at the Confederate’s Achilles’ Heel – Snavely Ford. Snavely Ford was an alternate crossing of Antietam Creek, and it was impossible for the Confederates to heavily defend both, they were so far away from each other. This is why Jones only posted one brigade to contest the bridge – the minute the Union side learned of the ford, the Bridge would become indefensible. Jones’s men would be needed in the later fight closer to Sharpsburg.

Toombs’ men were strung out below the present-day patio, snug in their rifle pits, with a commanding view of the Bridge, and any ground nearby.

The hiker follows the asphalt trail down to the bridge, and crosses over to the east or Union side. In so doing, he traverses the no-man’s land between the grounds occupied by the two armies.


B – Burnside Bridge

Here at the Union side of Burnside Bridge, the terrain advantage enjoyed by the Confederates becomes even more obvious. The patio and the bluffs nearby seem to frown down on where the Union soldiers needed to be to gain the bridge.

On the near corner (northeast) of the Burnside Bridge is a large sycamore tree. This tree is special, as it is a “witness tree”. The tree is more then 150 years old, and was here during the battle. Union soldiers ran, fought, and died under the boughs of this very tree. The tree was smaller then, but it was there.



One attack, two attack, three attack ... four ?
Exhibit tables on the Union side of the bridge display the series of failed attacks that Union forces launched upon the bridge.
1) Cook’s brigade was to hit the bridge from the right, while the 11th CT distracted from the left.
2) Nagle’s brigade then charged along the roadway leading up to the roadway, suffering disastrous casualties before it made it to the bridge
3) The 51st PA and 51st NY then attacked the bridge simultaneously and carried it.
Note that attack 1) was made up of two columns. Both columns were beaten back, and one of them got pathetically lost. For this reason, some historians count “Attack #1” as two attacks, because that’s what they deteriorated into. If we split the first attack into two parts, then there were a grand total of four attacks on Burnside Bridge, the last one being successful.

Hike along the bank of Antietam Creek along towards the north. Follow the trail in it’s right hand turn just before Stop 1.

Stop 1 – Union Plan and Organization

The Union plan to size the bridge involved feint, diversion, and flanking. It also involved carelessness. Burnside had actually been hoping he’d be able to take the bridge without a fight. Official word from US Army engineers was that that a ford existed a half mile south of the bridge. One of the four 9th Corps divisions under Gen. Isaac Peace Rodman would find it, seize it, use it, and flank the Confederate positions. Thus the Confederates would be forced to abandon the bridge defense.

The alleged ford had a serious drawback-it didn’t really exist. The engineers had either misjudged the steepness of the banks at this half-mile point, or had confused this ‘ford’ with Snavely’s Ford, which was actually two miles south of the bridge. Both Rodman and Burnside seem to have neglected to conduct any reconnaissance in this department.

The attacks on the bridge were meant to be diversionary in nature. If things had gone as they were supposed too, Toombs’ Confederates would have been distracted by the federals to their front, that they’d not notice Rodman flanking. Rodman of course, was not going to be in position for a good long while.

Cook’s Blunder
Lack of reconnaissance seemed to trickle down through the 9th Corps on this day. Col. George Crook did not note the approaches to the bridge, despite the fact that his brigade had been camped in the area for two days. Thus, when his brigade stepped to the attack, they became disoriented in a strip of woods, and reached Antietam Creek at this point, too far north to be any direct threat to the bridge, and much too far away to give any support or protection to the hapless 11th Connecticut. Crooks men hit the dirt, and exchanged volleys with the men of the 20th Georgia, strung out in a long line on the western side of the Antietam.

The trail continues to the east, up the hill, and then cuts south along the ridgeline and into the woods.

Stop 2 - Burnside Bridge Overlook



The Attack of the 51sts
This trail stop is in the woods, with a vista cut out, presenting a photogenic view of Burnside Bridge. This is the same view that the men of the 51st Pennsylvania and 51st New York of General Edward G. Ferrero’s brigade had as they stormed the span. This attack was the last and successful one, and this view gives a fairly good idea of why this attack worked when the others didn’t. Ferrero’s men were safe from enemy fire behind this ridge. They were only exposed a short time to the Confederate rifles as they advanced. The two regiments only had a short distance to hustle to make it to the bridge.

The reverse side of the slope was, of course where Ferrero’s men formed up to prepare for their attack. General Ferrero had been a dance instructor before the war, and he was not a favorite amongst his men. Indeed, the men of 51st PA were irritated with him in that their whiskey ration had been taken away as a disciplinary measure. When Ferrero tried to pep talk his two 51sts, one of his Pennsylvanians asked if they’d get their whiskey back. Ferrero promised to make matters right, just before the Keystone and Empire Staters charged the bridge.

The trail continues south through uneven terrain to the 11th Connecticut Monument


Stop 3 – 11th Connecticut Monument



The 11th Connecticut was had never been major battle before. These Nutmeg Statesmen were under the command of the brilliant 26-year-old Col. Henry Kingsbury, who had graduated 4th in his class at West Point in 1861 (a good deal higher then the last in that class, George Armstrong Custer).

Nation Divided, Family Divided
Like many West Point graduates, he knew many men who were serving with the Confederacy. In fact, two of his brothers in law were wearing Confederate gray. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, a general in Tennessee, had married Kingsbury’s older sister. In addition, Kingsbury’s wife, Eva had a sister named Rebecca. Rebecca was married to Confederate General David R Jones … the very same David R. Jones that was the division commander of the Confederates on this sector of the battlefield. Kingsbury’s men would be shooting, and be shot by, the men under his brother in law’s command. Sadly, such horrifying ironies were not uncommon in the Civil War.

Abandoned by a Blunder
The 11th was supposed to charge the bridge from this spot while an entire brigade under Col George Crook supported them. As we well know, Crook’s brigade got hopelessly lost and provided no support at all, leaving the doomed Connecticut men to the guns of Toombs’ Georgians.

The 11th tried to fight it out as best they could. Capt. J.D. Griswold led his company to try to splash their way across the creek – but was gunned down as he hit the opposite bank. The rest of the 11th gamely tried to fire back at the 2nd Georgia, but the Peach Stators were well concealed and under cover, giving the Federals very little to aim at. The men from the 11th however fell left and right, out in the open in this close-range fight.

Col. Kingsbury took a bullet to the heel, another shot to the leg. As his men helped him back to the rear, he was shot in the shoulder, and finally in the abdomen. He would die within a day. He’d never meet his son, Henry Jr., who was born in December.

Gen David R. Jones was distraught to learn that not only was his brother-in-law dead, but also had met his fate under the guns of Jones’ men. Jones never got over this shock, dying of a heart attack 4 months after Antietam.

The 11th Connecticut lost a third of their men in this failed attack on the bridge. Bloodied and leaderless, they fell back to the safety of the woods.

From here, the trail leads down to the opening in the fence line. The hiker will bear in mind that at the point in which the timber breaks, Confederate sharpshooters had a perfect shot at any solder on the clear ground. The trail follows the footsteps of both the 11th CT and the Union soldiers of Nagle’s brigade.


Stop 4 – Fence Opening

This venerated ground was fought over twice. Here the hiker stands on the ground upon which both the men of Kingsbury’s 11th CT fought and died, and later Nagle’s brigade made their embarrassing contribution.

Following the failures of Crook and Kingsbury’s 11th Connecticut, Burnside ordered General James Nagle to lead his brigade in the next attack.

Nagle’s method was straightforward. Two of his regiments, the 2nd Maryland and the 6th New Hampshire, passed through this fence opening and down the road towards the bridge. Nagle’s other two regiments, the 48th Pennsylvania and 9th New Hampshire, would try –ineffectually – to provide covering fire from the tree line. The simple fact was at that range, it was impossible to locate Confederate targets to shoot at, and so the Pennsylvanians and New Hampshire men posed no threat to the Georgians.

A Road of Slaughter
When the Marylanders and men of the 6th New Hampshire charged down the road with fixed bayonets, they were at a range of about 40 yards – no marksmanship challenge at all- from the men of the 2nd Georgia. Toombs’ men could scarcely believe their luck. This would be too easy.



Muskets barked at an increased tempo as the Peach Stators intensified their fire, and Union soldiers fell at almost every shot. Marylanders collapsed in heaps, tripping their healthy comrades, and Granite Stators dropped to the left and the right. Nagle’s ill-conceived attack was a bloody fiasco, and the two regiments lost all cohesion, broke off the attack and fled in great disorder from this cursed road. They did not stop until they reached the safety of the woods.

The trail concludes by following the old roadbed of the Rohrbach Road. The road follows in the footsteps of the ill-fated 2nd MD and 6th NH until about the halfway point. By then, the hiker has made it further then the luckiest Union soldier in Nagle’s brigade had.


Stop 5 -- Burnside Bridge Again

Cook’s brigade had gotten lost, and had left the 11th CT to their fate. Nagle was repulsed with heavy casualties. Burnside made one last attempt. The aforementioned (at stop 2) 51st PA and 51st NY regiments were to charge the bridge. After promising the Pennsylvanians their whiskey, Nagle ordered them to the attack.

A Foothold at Last
With a shout the two 51sts dashed down the hill behind the bridge and charged the two flanks of the bridge. The Pennsylvanians fell in behind the stonewall on the right, and the Empire Stators lined up by the fence to the left. Resting their muskets on stones and fence rails, they took their revenge on the Confederate sharpshooters who had so tormented the 9th Corps for the last three hours. Volleys blazed across the Antietam Creek into the positions of the 2nd and 20th Georgia.

The weight of the Union firepower finally began to tell. The Confederate fire slackened as Georgians fell dead and wounded. Ammunition started giving out as well, and living Confederates scavenged ammo from the dead and wounded.

Across the Bridge!

The men of the two 51sts sensed that success was near, and simultaneously and spontaneously left their cover and charged across the bridge, the stars and stripes and regimental flags leading the way. For Toombs’ men, time was running out.

The coup-de-grace for the Confederates was when they received very bad news from the south. The Union division of Isaac Rodman had crossed the creek to the south at Snavely’s Ford. This made any further resistance pointless, and the survivors of the 2nd and 20th Georgia were ordered to pull back, lest they be pinned by Rodman’s men coming up from their left while Fererro crossed the bridge to their front.

The men of these two regiments, not more then 500 in number, had crippled the entire 9th Corps. 12,500 men, for a full 3 hours; a stand had been nothing short of heroic.

One Confederate officer would not cede defeat, and chose to die a hero. Lt. Col. William Holmes of the 2nd Georgia ran down to the bridge, waving his sword in defiance. Victorious Federal soldiers shot him down.

The precious Rohrbach Bridge, forever after known as Burnside’s Bridge, was now in Union hands. 500 Northern men had fallen in their oft-ill conceived attempts to take it. The skeletal force of defending Southerners had only lost 160 men.

The entire balance of the 9th Corps would traverse it to take positions to attack the Confederate lines. 8,000 soldiers plus supply wagons, ammunition wagons and ambulances would trudge and rumble across it, as Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s right flank lay exposed to take Burnside’s killing blow.

What happened next is a tale that is told on Trail # 3, the Final Attack.

Paoli Battlefield - The Terrors of the Night

Overview
On September 20th, 1777 a portion of the Continental Army was camped on the fields of several farmers near Paoli in the modern day town of Malvern PA. They were under the command of one of George Washington's ablest generals, Anthony Wayne. Their mission was to spy on the main British Army, note when they crossed the Schuylkill River, and to attack the enemy's baggage trains when an opportunity presented itself.

On the night of September 20th, a British task force under the command of General Charles Grey attacked the encampment. Using ingenious timing and tactics, Grey's small British force routed Wayne's much larger American force. The flight of Wayne's detachment secured the surrounding area for the main British Army, and insured a smooth crossing of the Schuylkill River.

Although a relatively minor clash of the Philadelphia campaign, the battle has a towering place in the annals of American propaganda, and serves as an interesting example of the passions that often follow a lopsided, imaginative, and unusually terrifying battle.

The Battle of Paoli

Background to the Battle
In August 1777 a British Army under Sir William Howe had landed in Maryland for the purpose of attacking the American capital at Philadelphia. Upon landing at the Head of Elk, the British Army Marched north.

The American Army under Gen. George Washington stood and fought at Brandywine Creek on September 11th, 1777. The Americans were defeated, but not demoralized and searched for another opportunity to harm the British before they captured Philadelphia.

Five days later, on Sept 16th, the British attempted to pursue Washington's army. Washington was equally eager for the fray. The two armies met just north of Malvern -- but just as the two forces engaged, a torrential thunderstorm hit, soaking both armies, and ruining all of the Americans' ammunition. This non-battle, called the "Battle Of The Clouds" resulted in Washington ordering his men to retreat north towards Reading - intentionally leaving behind Anthony Wayne's detachment of Pennsylvanians.

Wayne's mission was to stay hidden and monitor the progress of British Army. Washington and Wayne knew that that in order to enter Philadelphia, Howe would have to cross the Schuylkill. In order to do that safely, Howe would send the main body of his infantry across the river, and then have his supply wagons follow, escorted by only a few soldiers or horsemen (Such was the standard way for a professional army to cross a river). If Wayne could stay hidden while the British crossed, he might be able to successfully raid the vulnerable British baggage wagons- while the British Army was on the wrong side of the river.

And so it came to pass that Wayne's small detachment of about 2200 men camped on these fields, biding their time and waiting for their moment to strike. The men were bivouacked in booths or wigwams made of brush and tree branches. The camp stretched for about 200 yards from the west to the east, with a timberline to their rear or south. Wayne was careful and contentious. Guard posts were set up several miles from the camp, covering every possible route of British attack.

Blown Security
Washington's plan was audacious and innovative, but relied on one key detail going right for Wayne- something that as it turned out, neither he nor Wayne had any control over. The British needed to remain completely oblivious to Wayne's presence until he struck. Both Washington and Wayne were clearly hoping that 2200 Continental soldiers would somehow go unnoticed camping in the enemy's rear.

Not only did the British learn of the American presence, they fully aware of their composition and mission. In addition, there were several Loyalist residents who would be happy to guide the British directly to the American encampment. And so the British came up with their own secret plan, and unlike the Americans' their secrets were going to be kept.

No Flints
British Major General Charles Grey was given command of the operation. Knowing that Anthony Wayne was no fool and would have a guarded camp, he hatched a brilliant scheme for attacking him. He would attack at night, something very rare during the Revolutionary War. His men would not fire a single shot and rely solely on the bayonet. As the British soldiers formed up in their camps, they were ordered to unload their weapons. If they could not do so, they were ordered to remove the flint chips from their pieces, making them impossible to fire.

At 10:00pm on the night of the 20th, Grey's force set out towards the Americans, about 1200 strong. Grey's force was about half the size of his American quarry, but Grey was confident that he had most of the advantages. He had the location of his sleeping enemy, surprise - possibly complete surprise - would be on his side, and the general discipline of a British unit was reliably superior to that of the Americans.

Wayne was and would continue to be one of Washington's best and most reliable field commanders. He had taken every precaution that a general takes when bedding his army down for the night. Unfortunately for his command, his standard security measures were about to be undone by the tactics of a military genius.


Picket Post 4
Wayne's posting of cavalry pickets (called videttes) saved the ensuing action from being an even worse disaster then it was. A mounted patrol spotted the advancing British on the Sweedesford Road. Receiving no response to their challenge, the videttes fired at the British, and galloped at full speed into camp to raise the alarm.

The foot pickets, as it turned out were destined for a grim fate. The first bloodshed would be at "Post Number Four". The British marched silently up to the first picket post they encountered. The American pickets fired at the difficult-to-see shadows on the road. The British soldiers charged, bayonets flashed, screams rent the air ...then silence as the British marched on. The few survivors of Post Four scattered.


Alarm
At the American camp, groggy Continentals were roused from their sleep by the horsemen thundering through. Wayne immediately ordered an evacuation, and commanded his easternmost infantry brigade to form up as he moved out his four cannons. Soldiers stumbled from their wigwams, snatched their weapons, and tried to form up in the dark. At the tree line, artillerymen struggled to withdraw their pieces. The Pennsylvanians formed up in reasonably good order, and began the somewhat lengthy process of marching 2200 men away from the British.

The Next picket post, Number Three, was much closer to the camp. Soldiers here also challenged the British, fired and withdrew back to the camp, some of them falling to British bayonets, others fighting hand to hand. With the sounds of fighting at Post Number Three audible, Wayne ordered his easternmost brigade to form a rearguard and support the post.

Steel, Fire and Panic
It was already too late for Post Three. At the eastern end of the campsite, the British had arrived. Their plan had a worked almost perfectly. At the American camp, just a few dozen yards away now, they could see the Continentals struggling to form lines. The shapes of the armed men were silhouetted perfectly by the still-burning campfires. Giving a loud "HUZZAH!" the British charged into the camp, their wicked twenty-inch steel bayonets promising death to all who stood before them.

The British tactics bore lethal fruit. Some Americans were illuminated by their own campfires. Other Americans gave themselves away by firing at the semi-hidden British. British soldiers rushed everywhere they saw a musket flash or the shadow of a Continental. First came a wave of light infantrymen, then a charge by twelve dragoons, slashing and hacking everything in sight. Finally a line of 600 Scottish Highlanders roared through the camp.

For the Americans, all was confusion, giving way to panic. They had fought the British before, but not like this. Not in the pitch black of night, and not with their enemy acting with such uncharacteristic stealth and silence. They were used to watching their enemy approach with flags waving and drums pounding a cadence, with fifes squealing and even the hateful bagpipes of the Highland regiments screeching. For the unfortunate Pennsylvanians on the eastern end of the camp, this was nothing but silently moving shadows, ominous bulks swiftly rushing towards them, and finally impalement on the evil triangular blades of the bayonets.

At the western end of the camp the American evacuation had been going relatively smoothly, until a cannon got stuck at a fence line. It was eventually freed, but hundreds of Continentals were stalled in their retreat, and forced to face their British attackers. Once the cannon was freed, Americans poured out to the west, fleeing their old encampment. Miraculously, none of the artillery was captured.

By now the conflict was coming to a grisly, fiery close. British units were mopping up the eastern end of the camp. All had happened quickly. Some Americans hadn't even woken up and gotten out of their booths. These men were ordered to surrender. Some did. Others, half-mad with terror, and thinking they were about to be murdered in cold blood, refused. Snagging burning timbers from the campfires the British burned them out, save for a few who were so crazed with fear that they chose to perish in their burning shelters.

Aftermath
The British had lost fewer then 20 men killed and wounded during the fight. The American toll was horrifying. 53 men had been killed, almost all by swords and bayonets. 113 were wounded, and 71 were captured. Wayne's conduct was examined by both a court of inquiry and a general court-marshal (at his own request) and was exonerated of any negligence and wrongdoing in defending his camp. He would retain Washington's trust, and play a significant role in the later years of the Revolution.

The battle was a psychologically traumatic one for the American survivors. All battles are horrible of course, but the elements of this engagement - the night attack, and the use of the gory bayonets left a deeper-then-usual scar on the psyche of the Continental soldiers. The Battle of Paoli, very soon after called the "Paoli Massacre" was a night the Americans never forgot - or ever forgave the British for.


Propaganda
The American propaganda machine immediately went to work, smearing the British with cries of "Massacre". To this day, signs and markers near the memorial park/ battlefield identify the action -inaccurately and even unethically- as "The Paoli Massacre". Lies were spread that the British had offered no quarter (news that would have surprised the 71 prisoners taken), and that the British had gleefully stabbed the helpless Continentals as they pleaded for mercy, treating them like so much livestock to be butchered. The motivations for such fibs usually boiled down to two reasons.

Firstly, with Anthony Wayne one of the most respected American generals, his utter defeat at Paoli was particularly embarrassing to the American cause. It was much more soothing to the American ego to accuse the British of wicked foul brutality and barbarism then it was to acknowledge the fact that even good generals can be soundly defeated by an innovative and competent enemy.

Secondly, the propagandists pretended (as such people tend to do) that the innovative and surprising British tactics were an inherent breach of some code of decency. In the fevered reasoning of such men only the most cruel barbarian would surprise his enemy in the middle of the night, and rely on a weapon that he was trained to use, but his foe was not.

It wasn't until much later that this reasoning was recognized for the poppycock that it was (and is). There were no rules of fair play in war, not the Revolution or any other. The only crime the British were guilty of was one-sided victory.

Circumventing and overwhelming the opposition's security, surprising the enemy when their guard is down, and using weapons that give one's own side the advantage is the mark of a superior military mind, not a an amoral butcher. Similarly, unfamiliarity with a weapon like the bayonet, which the Americans were not yet well schooled in, is a military liability rather then a sign of humaneness. No historian, professional or amateur should be fooled by the wails of 18th century patriots who sought to deny that the Battle of Paoli was brilliant British victory, rather then horrid massacre of helpless Pennsylvanians. As a student of history knows, there are authentic massacres, atrocities, and butcheries enough in the world, without unfairly applying the any of these terms to this battle.


Hiking Tour

The Paoli Memorial Grounds / Battlefield Park is on Monument Avenue in Malvern PA.

Grave site / 1817 Monument



Central to the story of Paoli is the gravesite - the grounds have a stone wall enclosing the final resting place of the 53 American dead. Atop the mound is the second-oldest Revolutionary War monument in America (the oldest one's in Lexington, MA). The marker dates from 1817. To prevent any further weathering, it's enclosed in a Plexiglas case.

1877 Monument

The Obelisk is only a few dozen yards away. It was built in 1877. The inscriptions on the faces copy those of the 1817 monument. It should be noted here that the 1817 marker was commissioned when the massacre mythos was still running high, and thus the inscriptions on both markers are a hysterical indictment of the British. Watch for the shrieks of "cold blooded cruelty" and "British barbarity". It's best not to learn one's history from this obelisk. That's what the Battlefield is for.

Battlefield

About the size of four football fields, the Battlefield is the site of Wayne's encampment. Eight information panels tell the story of the brief and brutal battle, and do an excellent job of immersing the visitor into the ill-fated bivouac.

Not to be missed is the second panel, which shows and explains the painting "A Dreadful Scene of Havock" by Xavier della Gatta, said to be an accurate composite of actions at Paoli.

Four panels are immediately visible in the center of the field, and four more form a line along the timberline, the same timberline that was there in 1777. According to the panels, the field is very well preserved. The furthest most panel is about 300 yards away, and a lazy course to view all the panels makes for a leisurely and non-strenuous hike of slightly more then about a half mile round trip.

As with most battle-parks, it's peaceful, pleasant and quiet now. Local residents happily use the area to walk their dogs, so a visitor is liable to have company of both the two and four-legged variety.