Antietam National Battlefield -- Hiking Trail #2

Union Advance Trail - Attack and Defense of the Burnside Bridge

Antietam National Battlefield established this hiking trail for those visitors wishing to explore the terrain around Burnside Bridge. The trail covers the ground that the soldiers of the Union 9th Corps covered as they tried to capture the bridge. Capturing the bridge was a key step to the 9th Corps attack on the Confederate right. The Confederate positions are also examined at the trail's start.

The auto tour, of course presents an overview of the battle, but among all the tour stops on the auto tour, it is stops 9 and 10 that are most incomplete without exiting the car and walking around. Indeed, Burnside Bridge, one of the most iconic battlefield landmarks is not visible from the parking area of tour stop 9!

Civil War Traveler offers a free downloadable podcast, and the National Park Service sells a brochure with a trail map. The trail map is also available for download.


Podcast

http://www.civilwartraveler.com/audio/index.html

Map

http://www.nps.gov/anti/planyourvisit/hiking.htm

It should be noted that there are slight differences between the tour presented in the official National Park tour book and the podcast. In the book, Tour Stop 1 is on the other side of the bridge. It's officially marked with a post with a "1". The podcast on the other hand, makes the patio near the parking area the first stop, and makes the bridge itself the second stop. Tour Stop 1 in the book is Tour Stop 3 in the podcast. The tour thus continues with a "two stop" differential in the two tours. I'm going by the NPS tour markers, and I've added "A" and "B" at the beginning for the patio and bridge. The tour route is identical for both podcasts.

The trail spends most of its course following the ground involved during the Union attacks. Perhaps somewhat irritatingly the trail does not flow in chronological order. Rather, it takes us to the points involved in the first attack, then fourth, then second, and then third attack, before arriving back at the bridge.

The trail is a mile long, and generally easy, except for two hills. Wear good shoes, use a hiking staff, and watch the groundhog holes and poison ivy!


Trailhead Start

Hikers leave their car at the parking area, find the stone wall, and step onto the patio.

A- Confederate Patio

The patio provides a commanding view of the bridge below. The Confederates posted here, though few in numbers owned a clear terrain advantage. Not only did they have the high ground, but they also had tree cover, and ready-made rifle pits. In fact, these rifle pits still exist today. The pits were created years before the battle by the stones used to build the bridge. Little did the engineers and bridge builders know that in quarrying the stone to build the bridge, they’d be assisting Confederate troops trying to defend it! Walk up to the railing or wall and observe the rifle pits below.

All these advantages would prove necessary to the Confederates, because theirs was a formidable task. With the heavy fighting occurring on the northern end of the battlefield (The Cornfield, The Sunken Road), Confederate General Robert E. Lee had stripped away many of the solders from this end of his battle line, his right flank, to shore up his overwhelmed left flank. Only a skeletal force of brave Rebels stood between the Union 9th Corps, the town of Sharpsburg, and Potomac River fords, the capture of which would have surely spelled the end of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, and the Civil War.

Confederate Chain of Command
Confederate General James Longstreet was theoretically in charge of the right half of Lee’s line, but his influence on the events surrounding Burnside Bridge was small. Most of his command was in the northern part of the battlefield, assisting General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s half of the army. (Indeed, Longstreet’s and Jackson’s divisions were so overlapped, that figuring out whose division was occupying what ground is one of the more daunting challenges of touring this particular battlefield).

Only one of Longstreet’s divisions, under Gen. David R Jones was protecting the southern part of the town of Sharpsburg – the only division facing Burnside. To guard against the 9th Corps’ 12,000 federals, Jones only had 3,300 men in his lines.

Only one of Jones’ five small brigades was posted along the bluffs here along the creek. It was under the command of Gen. Robert Toombs. Toombs posted the 2nd Georgia on the left of this point, and the 20th Georgia on the right. The 50th Georgia was posted further to the south, at the Confederate’s Achilles’ Heel – Snavely Ford. Snavely Ford was an alternate crossing of Antietam Creek, and it was impossible for the Confederates to heavily defend both, they were so far away from each other. This is why Jones only posted one brigade to contest the bridge – the minute the Union side learned of the ford, the Bridge would become indefensible. Jones’s men would be needed in the later fight closer to Sharpsburg.

Toombs’ men were strung out below the present-day patio, snug in their rifle pits, with a commanding view of the Bridge, and any ground nearby.

The hiker follows the asphalt trail down to the bridge, and crosses over to the east or Union side. In so doing, he traverses the no-man’s land between the grounds occupied by the two armies.


B – Burnside Bridge

Here at the Union side of Burnside Bridge, the terrain advantage enjoyed by the Confederates becomes even more obvious. The patio and the bluffs nearby seem to frown down on where the Union soldiers needed to be to gain the bridge.

On the near corner (northeast) of the Burnside Bridge is a large sycamore tree. This tree is special, as it is a “witness tree”. The tree is more then 150 years old, and was here during the battle. Union soldiers ran, fought, and died under the boughs of this very tree. The tree was smaller then, but it was there.



One attack, two attack, three attack ... four ?
Exhibit tables on the Union side of the bridge display the series of failed attacks that Union forces launched upon the bridge.
1) Cook’s brigade was to hit the bridge from the right, while the 11th CT distracted from the left.
2) Nagle’s brigade then charged along the roadway leading up to the roadway, suffering disastrous casualties before it made it to the bridge
3) The 51st PA and 51st NY then attacked the bridge simultaneously and carried it.
Note that attack 1) was made up of two columns. Both columns were beaten back, and one of them got pathetically lost. For this reason, some historians count “Attack #1” as two attacks, because that’s what they deteriorated into. If we split the first attack into two parts, then there were a grand total of four attacks on Burnside Bridge, the last one being successful.

Hike along the bank of Antietam Creek along towards the north. Follow the trail in it’s right hand turn just before Stop 1.

Stop 1 – Union Plan and Organization

The Union plan to size the bridge involved feint, diversion, and flanking. It also involved carelessness. Burnside had actually been hoping he’d be able to take the bridge without a fight. Official word from US Army engineers was that that a ford existed a half mile south of the bridge. One of the four 9th Corps divisions under Gen. Isaac Peace Rodman would find it, seize it, use it, and flank the Confederate positions. Thus the Confederates would be forced to abandon the bridge defense.

The alleged ford had a serious drawback-it didn’t really exist. The engineers had either misjudged the steepness of the banks at this half-mile point, or had confused this ‘ford’ with Snavely’s Ford, which was actually two miles south of the bridge. Both Rodman and Burnside seem to have neglected to conduct any reconnaissance in this department.

The attacks on the bridge were meant to be diversionary in nature. If things had gone as they were supposed too, Toombs’ Confederates would have been distracted by the federals to their front, that they’d not notice Rodman flanking. Rodman of course, was not going to be in position for a good long while.

Cook’s Blunder
Lack of reconnaissance seemed to trickle down through the 9th Corps on this day. Col. George Crook did not note the approaches to the bridge, despite the fact that his brigade had been camped in the area for two days. Thus, when his brigade stepped to the attack, they became disoriented in a strip of woods, and reached Antietam Creek at this point, too far north to be any direct threat to the bridge, and much too far away to give any support or protection to the hapless 11th Connecticut. Crooks men hit the dirt, and exchanged volleys with the men of the 20th Georgia, strung out in a long line on the western side of the Antietam.

The trail continues to the east, up the hill, and then cuts south along the ridgeline and into the woods.

Stop 2 - Burnside Bridge Overlook



The Attack of the 51sts
This trail stop is in the woods, with a vista cut out, presenting a photogenic view of Burnside Bridge. This is the same view that the men of the 51st Pennsylvania and 51st New York of General Edward G. Ferrero’s brigade had as they stormed the span. This attack was the last and successful one, and this view gives a fairly good idea of why this attack worked when the others didn’t. Ferrero’s men were safe from enemy fire behind this ridge. They were only exposed a short time to the Confederate rifles as they advanced. The two regiments only had a short distance to hustle to make it to the bridge.

The reverse side of the slope was, of course where Ferrero’s men formed up to prepare for their attack. General Ferrero had been a dance instructor before the war, and he was not a favorite amongst his men. Indeed, the men of 51st PA were irritated with him in that their whiskey ration had been taken away as a disciplinary measure. When Ferrero tried to pep talk his two 51sts, one of his Pennsylvanians asked if they’d get their whiskey back. Ferrero promised to make matters right, just before the Keystone and Empire Staters charged the bridge.

The trail continues south through uneven terrain to the 11th Connecticut Monument


Stop 3 – 11th Connecticut Monument



The 11th Connecticut was had never been major battle before. These Nutmeg Statesmen were under the command of the brilliant 26-year-old Col. Henry Kingsbury, who had graduated 4th in his class at West Point in 1861 (a good deal higher then the last in that class, George Armstrong Custer).

Nation Divided, Family Divided
Like many West Point graduates, he knew many men who were serving with the Confederacy. In fact, two of his brothers in law were wearing Confederate gray. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, a general in Tennessee, had married Kingsbury’s older sister. In addition, Kingsbury’s wife, Eva had a sister named Rebecca. Rebecca was married to Confederate General David R Jones … the very same David R. Jones that was the division commander of the Confederates on this sector of the battlefield. Kingsbury’s men would be shooting, and be shot by, the men under his brother in law’s command. Sadly, such horrifying ironies were not uncommon in the Civil War.

Abandoned by a Blunder
The 11th was supposed to charge the bridge from this spot while an entire brigade under Col George Crook supported them. As we well know, Crook’s brigade got hopelessly lost and provided no support at all, leaving the doomed Connecticut men to the guns of Toombs’ Georgians.

The 11th tried to fight it out as best they could. Capt. J.D. Griswold led his company to try to splash their way across the creek – but was gunned down as he hit the opposite bank. The rest of the 11th gamely tried to fire back at the 2nd Georgia, but the Peach Stators were well concealed and under cover, giving the Federals very little to aim at. The men from the 11th however fell left and right, out in the open in this close-range fight.

Col. Kingsbury took a bullet to the heel, another shot to the leg. As his men helped him back to the rear, he was shot in the shoulder, and finally in the abdomen. He would die within a day. He’d never meet his son, Henry Jr., who was born in December.

Gen David R. Jones was distraught to learn that not only was his brother-in-law dead, but also had met his fate under the guns of Jones’ men. Jones never got over this shock, dying of a heart attack 4 months after Antietam.

The 11th Connecticut lost a third of their men in this failed attack on the bridge. Bloodied and leaderless, they fell back to the safety of the woods.

From here, the trail leads down to the opening in the fence line. The hiker will bear in mind that at the point in which the timber breaks, Confederate sharpshooters had a perfect shot at any solder on the clear ground. The trail follows the footsteps of both the 11th CT and the Union soldiers of Nagle’s brigade.


Stop 4 – Fence Opening

This venerated ground was fought over twice. Here the hiker stands on the ground upon which both the men of Kingsbury’s 11th CT fought and died, and later Nagle’s brigade made their embarrassing contribution.

Following the failures of Crook and Kingsbury’s 11th Connecticut, Burnside ordered General James Nagle to lead his brigade in the next attack.

Nagle’s method was straightforward. Two of his regiments, the 2nd Maryland and the 6th New Hampshire, passed through this fence opening and down the road towards the bridge. Nagle’s other two regiments, the 48th Pennsylvania and 9th New Hampshire, would try –ineffectually – to provide covering fire from the tree line. The simple fact was at that range, it was impossible to locate Confederate targets to shoot at, and so the Pennsylvanians and New Hampshire men posed no threat to the Georgians.

A Road of Slaughter
When the Marylanders and men of the 6th New Hampshire charged down the road with fixed bayonets, they were at a range of about 40 yards – no marksmanship challenge at all- from the men of the 2nd Georgia. Toombs’ men could scarcely believe their luck. This would be too easy.



Muskets barked at an increased tempo as the Peach Stators intensified their fire, and Union soldiers fell at almost every shot. Marylanders collapsed in heaps, tripping their healthy comrades, and Granite Stators dropped to the left and the right. Nagle’s ill-conceived attack was a bloody fiasco, and the two regiments lost all cohesion, broke off the attack and fled in great disorder from this cursed road. They did not stop until they reached the safety of the woods.

The trail concludes by following the old roadbed of the Rohrbach Road. The road follows in the footsteps of the ill-fated 2nd MD and 6th NH until about the halfway point. By then, the hiker has made it further then the luckiest Union soldier in Nagle’s brigade had.


Stop 5 -- Burnside Bridge Again

Cook’s brigade had gotten lost, and had left the 11th CT to their fate. Nagle was repulsed with heavy casualties. Burnside made one last attempt. The aforementioned (at stop 2) 51st PA and 51st NY regiments were to charge the bridge. After promising the Pennsylvanians their whiskey, Nagle ordered them to the attack.

A Foothold at Last
With a shout the two 51sts dashed down the hill behind the bridge and charged the two flanks of the bridge. The Pennsylvanians fell in behind the stonewall on the right, and the Empire Stators lined up by the fence to the left. Resting their muskets on stones and fence rails, they took their revenge on the Confederate sharpshooters who had so tormented the 9th Corps for the last three hours. Volleys blazed across the Antietam Creek into the positions of the 2nd and 20th Georgia.

The weight of the Union firepower finally began to tell. The Confederate fire slackened as Georgians fell dead and wounded. Ammunition started giving out as well, and living Confederates scavenged ammo from the dead and wounded.

Across the Bridge!

The men of the two 51sts sensed that success was near, and simultaneously and spontaneously left their cover and charged across the bridge, the stars and stripes and regimental flags leading the way. For Toombs’ men, time was running out.

The coup-de-grace for the Confederates was when they received very bad news from the south. The Union division of Isaac Rodman had crossed the creek to the south at Snavely’s Ford. This made any further resistance pointless, and the survivors of the 2nd and 20th Georgia were ordered to pull back, lest they be pinned by Rodman’s men coming up from their left while Fererro crossed the bridge to their front.

The men of these two regiments, not more then 500 in number, had crippled the entire 9th Corps. 12,500 men, for a full 3 hours; a stand had been nothing short of heroic.

One Confederate officer would not cede defeat, and chose to die a hero. Lt. Col. William Holmes of the 2nd Georgia ran down to the bridge, waving his sword in defiance. Victorious Federal soldiers shot him down.

The precious Rohrbach Bridge, forever after known as Burnside’s Bridge, was now in Union hands. 500 Northern men had fallen in their oft-ill conceived attempts to take it. The skeletal force of defending Southerners had only lost 160 men.

The entire balance of the 9th Corps would traverse it to take positions to attack the Confederate lines. 8,000 soldiers plus supply wagons, ammunition wagons and ambulances would trudge and rumble across it, as Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s right flank lay exposed to take Burnside’s killing blow.

What happened next is a tale that is told on Trail # 3, the Final Attack.

Paoli Battlefield - The Terrors of the Night

Overview
On September 20th, 1777 a portion of the Continental Army was camped on the fields of several farmers near Paoli in the modern day town of Malvern PA. They were under the command of one of George Washington's ablest generals, Anthony Wayne. Their mission was to spy on the main British Army, note when they crossed the Schuylkill River, and to attack the enemy's baggage trains when an opportunity presented itself.

On the night of September 20th, a British task force under the command of General Charles Grey attacked the encampment. Using ingenious timing and tactics, Grey's small British force routed Wayne's much larger American force. The flight of Wayne's detachment secured the surrounding area for the main British Army, and insured a smooth crossing of the Schuylkill River.

Although a relatively minor clash of the Philadelphia campaign, the battle has a towering place in the annals of American propaganda, and serves as an interesting example of the passions that often follow a lopsided, imaginative, and unusually terrifying battle.

The Battle of Paoli

Background to the Battle
In August 1777 a British Army under Sir William Howe had landed in Maryland for the purpose of attacking the American capital at Philadelphia. Upon landing at the Head of Elk, the British Army Marched north.

The American Army under Gen. George Washington stood and fought at Brandywine Creek on September 11th, 1777. The Americans were defeated, but not demoralized and searched for another opportunity to harm the British before they captured Philadelphia.

Five days later, on Sept 16th, the British attempted to pursue Washington's army. Washington was equally eager for the fray. The two armies met just north of Malvern -- but just as the two forces engaged, a torrential thunderstorm hit, soaking both armies, and ruining all of the Americans' ammunition. This non-battle, called the "Battle Of The Clouds" resulted in Washington ordering his men to retreat north towards Reading - intentionally leaving behind Anthony Wayne's detachment of Pennsylvanians.

Wayne's mission was to stay hidden and monitor the progress of British Army. Washington and Wayne knew that that in order to enter Philadelphia, Howe would have to cross the Schuylkill. In order to do that safely, Howe would send the main body of his infantry across the river, and then have his supply wagons follow, escorted by only a few soldiers or horsemen (Such was the standard way for a professional army to cross a river). If Wayne could stay hidden while the British crossed, he might be able to successfully raid the vulnerable British baggage wagons- while the British Army was on the wrong side of the river.

And so it came to pass that Wayne's small detachment of about 2200 men camped on these fields, biding their time and waiting for their moment to strike. The men were bivouacked in booths or wigwams made of brush and tree branches. The camp stretched for about 200 yards from the west to the east, with a timberline to their rear or south. Wayne was careful and contentious. Guard posts were set up several miles from the camp, covering every possible route of British attack.

Blown Security
Washington's plan was audacious and innovative, but relied on one key detail going right for Wayne- something that as it turned out, neither he nor Wayne had any control over. The British needed to remain completely oblivious to Wayne's presence until he struck. Both Washington and Wayne were clearly hoping that 2200 Continental soldiers would somehow go unnoticed camping in the enemy's rear.

Not only did the British learn of the American presence, they fully aware of their composition and mission. In addition, there were several Loyalist residents who would be happy to guide the British directly to the American encampment. And so the British came up with their own secret plan, and unlike the Americans' their secrets were going to be kept.

No Flints
British Major General Charles Grey was given command of the operation. Knowing that Anthony Wayne was no fool and would have a guarded camp, he hatched a brilliant scheme for attacking him. He would attack at night, something very rare during the Revolutionary War. His men would not fire a single shot and rely solely on the bayonet. As the British soldiers formed up in their camps, they were ordered to unload their weapons. If they could not do so, they were ordered to remove the flint chips from their pieces, making them impossible to fire.

At 10:00pm on the night of the 20th, Grey's force set out towards the Americans, about 1200 strong. Grey's force was about half the size of his American quarry, but Grey was confident that he had most of the advantages. He had the location of his sleeping enemy, surprise - possibly complete surprise - would be on his side, and the general discipline of a British unit was reliably superior to that of the Americans.

Wayne was and would continue to be one of Washington's best and most reliable field commanders. He had taken every precaution that a general takes when bedding his army down for the night. Unfortunately for his command, his standard security measures were about to be undone by the tactics of a military genius.


Picket Post 4
Wayne's posting of cavalry pickets (called videttes) saved the ensuing action from being an even worse disaster then it was. A mounted patrol spotted the advancing British on the Sweedesford Road. Receiving no response to their challenge, the videttes fired at the British, and galloped at full speed into camp to raise the alarm.

The foot pickets, as it turned out were destined for a grim fate. The first bloodshed would be at "Post Number Four". The British marched silently up to the first picket post they encountered. The American pickets fired at the difficult-to-see shadows on the road. The British soldiers charged, bayonets flashed, screams rent the air ...then silence as the British marched on. The few survivors of Post Four scattered.


Alarm
At the American camp, groggy Continentals were roused from their sleep by the horsemen thundering through. Wayne immediately ordered an evacuation, and commanded his easternmost infantry brigade to form up as he moved out his four cannons. Soldiers stumbled from their wigwams, snatched their weapons, and tried to form up in the dark. At the tree line, artillerymen struggled to withdraw their pieces. The Pennsylvanians formed up in reasonably good order, and began the somewhat lengthy process of marching 2200 men away from the British.

The Next picket post, Number Three, was much closer to the camp. Soldiers here also challenged the British, fired and withdrew back to the camp, some of them falling to British bayonets, others fighting hand to hand. With the sounds of fighting at Post Number Three audible, Wayne ordered his easternmost brigade to form a rearguard and support the post.

Steel, Fire and Panic
It was already too late for Post Three. At the eastern end of the campsite, the British had arrived. Their plan had a worked almost perfectly. At the American camp, just a few dozen yards away now, they could see the Continentals struggling to form lines. The shapes of the armed men were silhouetted perfectly by the still-burning campfires. Giving a loud "HUZZAH!" the British charged into the camp, their wicked twenty-inch steel bayonets promising death to all who stood before them.

The British tactics bore lethal fruit. Some Americans were illuminated by their own campfires. Other Americans gave themselves away by firing at the semi-hidden British. British soldiers rushed everywhere they saw a musket flash or the shadow of a Continental. First came a wave of light infantrymen, then a charge by twelve dragoons, slashing and hacking everything in sight. Finally a line of 600 Scottish Highlanders roared through the camp.

For the Americans, all was confusion, giving way to panic. They had fought the British before, but not like this. Not in the pitch black of night, and not with their enemy acting with such uncharacteristic stealth and silence. They were used to watching their enemy approach with flags waving and drums pounding a cadence, with fifes squealing and even the hateful bagpipes of the Highland regiments screeching. For the unfortunate Pennsylvanians on the eastern end of the camp, this was nothing but silently moving shadows, ominous bulks swiftly rushing towards them, and finally impalement on the evil triangular blades of the bayonets.

At the western end of the camp the American evacuation had been going relatively smoothly, until a cannon got stuck at a fence line. It was eventually freed, but hundreds of Continentals were stalled in their retreat, and forced to face their British attackers. Once the cannon was freed, Americans poured out to the west, fleeing their old encampment. Miraculously, none of the artillery was captured.

By now the conflict was coming to a grisly, fiery close. British units were mopping up the eastern end of the camp. All had happened quickly. Some Americans hadn't even woken up and gotten out of their booths. These men were ordered to surrender. Some did. Others, half-mad with terror, and thinking they were about to be murdered in cold blood, refused. Snagging burning timbers from the campfires the British burned them out, save for a few who were so crazed with fear that they chose to perish in their burning shelters.

Aftermath
The British had lost fewer then 20 men killed and wounded during the fight. The American toll was horrifying. 53 men had been killed, almost all by swords and bayonets. 113 were wounded, and 71 were captured. Wayne's conduct was examined by both a court of inquiry and a general court-marshal (at his own request) and was exonerated of any negligence and wrongdoing in defending his camp. He would retain Washington's trust, and play a significant role in the later years of the Revolution.

The battle was a psychologically traumatic one for the American survivors. All battles are horrible of course, but the elements of this engagement - the night attack, and the use of the gory bayonets left a deeper-then-usual scar on the psyche of the Continental soldiers. The Battle of Paoli, very soon after called the "Paoli Massacre" was a night the Americans never forgot - or ever forgave the British for.


Propaganda
The American propaganda machine immediately went to work, smearing the British with cries of "Massacre". To this day, signs and markers near the memorial park/ battlefield identify the action -inaccurately and even unethically- as "The Paoli Massacre". Lies were spread that the British had offered no quarter (news that would have surprised the 71 prisoners taken), and that the British had gleefully stabbed the helpless Continentals as they pleaded for mercy, treating them like so much livestock to be butchered. The motivations for such fibs usually boiled down to two reasons.

Firstly, with Anthony Wayne one of the most respected American generals, his utter defeat at Paoli was particularly embarrassing to the American cause. It was much more soothing to the American ego to accuse the British of wicked foul brutality and barbarism then it was to acknowledge the fact that even good generals can be soundly defeated by an innovative and competent enemy.

Secondly, the propagandists pretended (as such people tend to do) that the innovative and surprising British tactics were an inherent breach of some code of decency. In the fevered reasoning of such men only the most cruel barbarian would surprise his enemy in the middle of the night, and rely on a weapon that he was trained to use, but his foe was not.

It wasn't until much later that this reasoning was recognized for the poppycock that it was (and is). There were no rules of fair play in war, not the Revolution or any other. The only crime the British were guilty of was one-sided victory.

Circumventing and overwhelming the opposition's security, surprising the enemy when their guard is down, and using weapons that give one's own side the advantage is the mark of a superior military mind, not a an amoral butcher. Similarly, unfamiliarity with a weapon like the bayonet, which the Americans were not yet well schooled in, is a military liability rather then a sign of humaneness. No historian, professional or amateur should be fooled by the wails of 18th century patriots who sought to deny that the Battle of Paoli was brilliant British victory, rather then horrid massacre of helpless Pennsylvanians. As a student of history knows, there are authentic massacres, atrocities, and butcheries enough in the world, without unfairly applying the any of these terms to this battle.


Hiking Tour

The Paoli Memorial Grounds / Battlefield Park is on Monument Avenue in Malvern PA.

Grave site / 1817 Monument



Central to the story of Paoli is the gravesite - the grounds have a stone wall enclosing the final resting place of the 53 American dead. Atop the mound is the second-oldest Revolutionary War monument in America (the oldest one's in Lexington, MA). The marker dates from 1817. To prevent any further weathering, it's enclosed in a Plexiglas case.

1877 Monument

The Obelisk is only a few dozen yards away. It was built in 1877. The inscriptions on the faces copy those of the 1817 monument. It should be noted here that the 1817 marker was commissioned when the massacre mythos was still running high, and thus the inscriptions on both markers are a hysterical indictment of the British. Watch for the shrieks of "cold blooded cruelty" and "British barbarity". It's best not to learn one's history from this obelisk. That's what the Battlefield is for.

Battlefield

About the size of four football fields, the Battlefield is the site of Wayne's encampment. Eight information panels tell the story of the brief and brutal battle, and do an excellent job of immersing the visitor into the ill-fated bivouac.

Not to be missed is the second panel, which shows and explains the painting "A Dreadful Scene of Havock" by Xavier della Gatta, said to be an accurate composite of actions at Paoli.

Four panels are immediately visible in the center of the field, and four more form a line along the timberline, the same timberline that was there in 1777. According to the panels, the field is very well preserved. The furthest most panel is about 300 yards away, and a lazy course to view all the panels makes for a leisurely and non-strenuous hike of slightly more then about a half mile round trip.

As with most battle-parks, it's peaceful, pleasant and quiet now. Local residents happily use the area to walk their dogs, so a visitor is liable to have company of both the two and four-legged variety.

Antietam National Battlefield - Hiking Trail #1

Hiking Trail - The Cornfield

Antietam National Battlefield has established this hiking trail for the sake of visitors who wish to explore the terrain around "The Bloody Cornfield" in more detail then that provided by the driving tour.

It is of course, possible to enjoy the battlefield tour without going on the hike, but history buffs will be rewarded by the trail that follows in the footsteps of Union soldiers as they advanced into battle in the pre-dawn light of September 17th 1862, and into the inferno of combat in the corn. Indeed, anyone who enjoys a good hike will be glad they went.

The National Park Service sells a tour map and pamphlet at the Visitor Center for a mere $2.00.

The map is also downloadable from the NPS site here.

http://www.nps.gov/anti/planyourvisit/hiking.htm

In addition, the website CivilWarTraveller.com provides a downloadable podcast for free. The podcast is narrated to match the tour stops.

http://www.civilwartraveler.com/audio/index.html



The tour begins at driving Tour Stop #2 (The Poffenberger Farm) The trail is 1.6 miles long, and takes between an hour and an hour and a half. Be careful of the groundhog holes and poison ivy.


Stop 1 – Parking area and Auto Tour Stop 2
(Fence across the street from the parking lot and Clara Barton monument)

Restless Night
This spot was the edge of the Union encampment on the night of Sept 16th -17th. The camps of General Joseph Hooker's 1st Corps were spread out to the north on the Poffenberger's fields. The Confederate troops under Thomas J "Stonewall" Jackson were mostly posted in the area of cornfield of the Miller farm, a half mile south. Cannons backed them up on the mild plateau near the Dunker Church.

Everyone slept knowing a fight was going to happen in the morning. Many were surprised that it had not happened the day before. On the 16th, in broad daylight, the Union 1st and 12th Corps splashed across the Antietam Creek to reach this staging area. Only a mild skirmish had occurred. And so the two armies bedded down for the night of the 16th, knowing that many of their friends would be dead within a day.

Hooker's orders from General McClellan (Commander of the Union Army of the Potomac) were to move out at first light and attack the Confederate positions. The responsibility for opening the battle would be his. Among his several vices, Hooker was given to boast, but he didn't need to stretch the truth on the night of the 16th. He commented to the several reporters that were constantly following him around, that "Tomorrow we will fight the battle that would decide the fate of the Republic".

General Hooker was an aggressive fighter, and was eager to carry out his orders. He had his soldiers on their feet at 5:00 am.

Directly south of this spot was a small woodlot known as the North Woods. An astute visitor will notice that there are many short, young trees in the immediate area. This is because the NPS is replanting the North Woods in an effort to restore the battleground to its Sept 1862 appearance.

Hiking south from Stop 1 to Stop 2 follows in the footsteps of Union soldiers as they left their camps, and crossed the North Woods.


Stop 2 – Out the Woods and Into the Fire

Battle Lines
As the soldiers woke up and formed up their battle lines, sporadic gunshots were heard. That was the skirmishers on both sides probing their opposing lines. The Union battle line of the 1st Corps was extensive, over a half mile long. One division of Union troops under Gen. Abner Doubleday stepped out of the North Woods at this point. Another division under Gen. James Ricketts formed up on the left. Behind, still back at the farm was the division of General George Gordon Meade.

Incoming!
The minute Doubleday’s men left the safety of the timberline, they were under attack by Confederate artillery. On their right flank, across the Hagerstown Pike was a ridge known as Nicodemus Heights. It is all private property today, and the heights are tree covered now. In 1862, the ground was open – and occupied by Confederate Major John Pelham’s dozen or so cannons. That number wasn’t enough to thwart the Union attack, but their advantageous position – combined with Pelham’s natural pluck and tenacity meant that these guns would punch above their weight.

Pelham’s cannons were aimed perfectly – the third shot landed in the middle of the 6th Wisconsin, killing 2 soldiers and wounding 11. Cannons from both sides joined in on the fight. More Confederate cannon engaged – those under Col. Stephen D. Lee (no close relation to the Robert E. Lee) deployed on the plateau near the Dunker Church. No Union soldier could doubt that they were in harms way. Far across the Antietam Creek, long range Union canons attempted to suppress the Confederate guns.

The Sparkling Corn
Hooker, Doubleday, and other Union officers had a much better view then their soldiers, (who had the same view the average hiker has) – they were on their horses, and their point of view was nine feet in the air. From there, they could see a foreboding sight. A half-mile away, the September sunlight caused a glistening, sparkling effect in the Miller cornfield. Thousands of Confederate soldiers, their bayonets and polished gun barrels catching the rising sun, were waiting for them.

Hiking from Stop 2 to Stop 3 traverses the Union line of battle. The hiker moves west, along what were once the ranks of Doubleday’s and then Ricketts’ men. After taking a sharp right hand turn, the hiker moves south, following in the footsteps of Ricketts’ division.


Stop 3 – Tricky Terrain an A Complicated Advance

Artillery Reaping
Immediately to the right is a subtle roll in the ground. As Doubleday and Ricketts advanced, Hooker noticed that the cornfield in front of him was filled with Confederates. Altering his battle plan slightly, he halted his infantry, and ordered 2 batteries of cannons (12 guns) to park hub-to-hub on that high ground, and destroy the Miller Cornfield and the Confederates therein. The cannons blazed away at point-blank range, firing shrapnel or ‘case shot’, an anti-personnel weapon. It was essentially a bomb fired from a cannon that was timed with a fuse to explode at a certain range. When the bomb exploded, bullets that were packed inside as well as fragments of shell scattered everywhere, killing, crippling and maiming anyone nearby. Hooker’s gunners had cut their fuses down to one-and-a-half seconds.

Tough Going
Moving a line of men a mile or so south would seem like a simple enough task. Battles however are nothing if not chaotic and unpredictable, and plans are often wrecked very soon after the first shot is fired. This happened at Antietam. Ricketts’ attack fell victim to every difficulty that could occur to a division. Confederate artillery killed and wounded soldiers as they advanced. The presence of the Union cannons delayed Doubleday, but didn’t delay Ricketts, chopping up the Federal attack. The hills and rolls in the terrain- to say nothing of the battle smoke - made it difficult to keep track of nearby friendly units.

Duryea Alone
One of Ricketts’ three brigade commanders was wounded and had to leave the field. A second brigade commander panicked at the shellfire and ran away, abandoning his troops. Only the third brigade, under General Abram Duryea made initial contact with the Confederates on schedule. Although the other two brigades would recover from their difficulties and join the fight, Duryea would begin this fight alone, and loose almost half his 1,000 men in just 30 minutes of combat.

Hiking from Stop 3 to Stop 4 continues in the footsteps of Ricketts’ men, to the point just before they entered the “Bloody Cornfield”.


Stop 4 - Corner of Death at Antietam

The worm fence marks the boundary of the Cornfield. Ricketts Union division, one brigade at a time, made deadly contact with Stonewall Jackson’s defending Confederates, pushing through the corn. Simultaneously, Doubleday’s men engaged to the west. As the battle progressed, the Cornfield would change hands several times. Troops who arrived later in the battle noticed that the horrible carnage followed a pattern- the worst casualties would always be at the edge of a landscape feature such as a woodlot, a roadway and this cornfield. Many of Ricketts men would meet their deaths at the southern end of this cornfield.

Counterattacking Confederate men would die in large numbers at this (northern) edge of the cornfield.

Hiking from Stop 4 to Stop 5 again traverses the Union line of battle, walking back along Ricketts’ lines and reaching Doubleday’s lines. Walk west along the northern border of the Cornfield to Stop 5


Stop 5 – The Most Sacred Ground – The Cornfield

The hiker is about to enter the David R. Miller Cornfield. This is the some of the most sacred and hallowed ground in the United States. Thousands of Union and Confederate soldiers died in these 30 acres of maize, as it changed hands time and again.

The reason why the cornfield was so dangerous is simple. Soldiers waiting on the other side of the cornfield couldn’t get clean shots at the men coming through the corn, and thus held their fire until the enemy reached the edge. When the soldiers finally opened fire, they did so at almost point-blank range. When Union troops first reached this point, they plunged into the corn, and the battle was joined at the southern edge. Later, when Confederate troops counterattacked, they themselves met a wall of lead from Union reinforcements at this the northern edge.

Union General John Gibbon commanded the first brigade of Doubleday’s men to enter the corn. Because of their bravery at the battles of Second Manassas and South Mountain, they had been dubbed The Iron Brigade. These Midwestern boys, men from Wisconsin and Indiana, took pride in both their nickname, and their army designation – the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division of the 1st Corps.

As the Midwesterners reached this point, they could see the dead and dying Confederates laying in the wrecked cornfield, the victims of the point-blank bombardment ordered by General Hooker. The Confederate battle line had by now abandoned the badly damaged cornfield and had regrouped on the other side of it.




Hiking from Stop 5 to Stop 6 follows in the footsteps of the Iron Brigade as they marched through the cornfield.


Stop 6 – Georgian Defense and Texas Counterattack

Douglas vs. The Iron Brigade
Col. Marcellus Douglas commanded the Confederate brigade in this area. His men bore the brunt of the artillery bombardment, and now braced for the Iron Brigade’s attack. The gray Georgia Monument to the left honors Douglas’s Georgians. As Gibbon’s Iron Brigade reached this southern edge of the cornfield, they receive their first volley at close range. Pausing at the edge of the corn, the Midwesterners fired back and the battle of Antietam was on in earnest. Hundreds of men dropped from the ranks, some killed on the spot, some wounded, but able get themselves to the rear, and others wounded so badly they could do nothing but lay there and plead for help.

Confederate Collapse
Douglas’s Confederates got the worst of this fight, having already been shocked and bloodied by the artillery. Another Confederate brigade arrived to support them, these men Louisianans under General Harry Hays. They filed in next to the Georgians, and were demolished by Ricketts men, who were, as we know covering Doubleday’s left. In a short time, both Douglas’ and Hays’ commands had lost more then half their men, and were retreating. Douglas himself was killed by an artillery shell that blew him into the air.

Gibbon’s cheering men of iron charged beyond the cornfield, followed by their reinforcements. The men of Doubleday’s division then caught a third Confederate brigade under Gen. William Starke in a murderous crossfire. After an intense firefight, during which at one point the two forces blasted away at each other from opposite sides of the Hagerstown Pike, Starke’s men were also put to flight. It was only 7:00 in the morning and already the Confederate battle line was breaking into pieces! Could anything stop the 1st Corps?

Lone Star
The rose colored monument directly across Cornfield Avenue holds the answer. It is the Texas Monument, and represents the very last reinforcements that Stonewall Jackson had available to him. General John Bell Hood’s Texans were held in reserve about a half mile away behind the Dunker Church (visible from this point between the trees). These men were all Jackson had to depend on, but they were some of the best.

The Texas Brigade had not only Texans but also Alabamians and Mississippians in their ranks. These men from the Confederate West had a reputation for being the roughest and toughest brawlers in the Confederate Army, and they took pride in living up to it. Being held in reserve, they had just started their cooking fires and were about to chow down on breakfast. Since they had been on the march for most of the campaign, it would have been their first hot-cooked meal in three days.

Before a single morsel could be eaten, the order to fall in and march to the front was given. The men of the Texas Brigade did not like this. Not one bit.

Lining up by the Dunker Church (and present day Visitor Center), the enraged Texans let out the Rebel Yell and charged into the Yankees who had dared to interrupt their meal. By now Doubleday’s men were fought out, low on ammunition, and fell back through the Cornfield, with the angry Texans right behind them.

The Texans themselves would then be crushed by Gen George Meade’s division of Union infantry and by the cannons that Hooker had deployed on the open ground to the north. The 1st Texas regiment would loose 82% of its men. The arrival of the Union 12th Corps from the east compelled Hood’s survivors to abandon this horrible Cornfield.

Hiking from Stop 6 to Stop 7 follows in the footsteps of Hood’s charging Confederates north along the Hagerstown Road.


Stop 7 – The Bugler and the General

Across the Hagerstown Pike are two cannons, representing a battery (six guns) of Union artillery. These guns were moved forward during the initial Union advance and fired on Douglas’ Confederates as the fight got underway. Perhaps it was even a shell from one of these guns that killed Col. Douglas. Such proximity to fighting infantry was incredibly dangerous, and this battery (Battery B, 4th US Artillery) took the casualties to prove it, almost 50 % including its commander.

When Hood’s Texans counterattacked, an already dangerous position became practically suicidal. There was no time to limber up the guns and retreat – the artillerymen had to either fight and win, or be overrun.

The soldiers manning the guns had just the ammunition for this sort of work – canister. Another anti-personnel weapon, canister consisted of a thin metal can packed with iron balls, like a very large load of buckshot. It could be used only at very short range. When a canister round was fired, the tin can flew apart immediately upon leaving the barrel sending the iron balls scattering everywhere. It turned the cannon into a huge shotgun. The cannons could also be loaded with two or even three rounds of canister for when things got desperate.

When Hood’s men counterattacked, things got desperate.

The effect of a blast of canister upon a line of infantry was possibly the most grisly sight in a war filled with grisly sights. The iron balls shredded human flesh, and ripped men apart where they stood. Arms and heads were torn off and thrown hither and yon. Such effects could happen from one cannon firing one load of this awful weapon. There were six cannons here, the surviving artillerymen fighting for their lives. Each cannon was loaded with at least double canister. Dozens of men would be killed and wounded in a single blast.


With half the men of the battery killed and wounded, and the battery in danger of being overrun, all hands were needed to work the guns. The battery’s bugle boy, 15-year-old Johnny Cook jumped to the task and helped load and fire the pieces. Before the war, Cook had been a Cincinnati paperboy. Before Antietam, he had been a bugler, one of the countless lads who joined up and usually served in non-combat roles, despite being very much in harms way. After Antietam he was a hero, awarded the Medal of Honor for his extreme courage in the face of mortal danger.

General John Gibbon needed these cannons’ firepower to protect his Iron Brigade. Having had training in artillery, he dismounted from his horse, loaded one of the pieces, and sighted it himself to make sure the blast was accurate.

The Confederates charged these cannons, but did not reach them. They were blasted to pieces within a few yards of the smoking muzzles of the guns. When the Union 12th Corps arrived on the battlefield, and pushed off the remaining Confederates, the combat mercifully died down in this, the bloodiest sector of the bloodiest day of the war.

Hiking from Stop 7 to Stop 8 follows the Hagerstown Road back towards Tour Stop 1. These would be the footsteps of a wounded Union soldier, limping back towards the Poffenberger Farm and medical aid.


Stop 8 -- The Miller Farm

The Northern side of the Miller Cornfield marks the furthest advance of Hood’s counterattack. Here’s were the Texans were brutally smashed by General Meade’s Pennsylvanians.

The battle of Antietam continued to rage in other sectors of the field – The West Woods, The Sunken Road, Burnside’s Bridge, and the Otto Farm would all see their share of horrors on that day, but perhaps only the Sunken Road would present a sight as grotesque as the Miller’s Cornfield.

City of Blue
After the battle, General McClellan declined to aggressively pursue Lee’s army. The Union Army stayed put in the fields around Sharpsburg. For two months, the 1200 residents of Sharpsburg reluctantly played host to 80,000 soldiers. From a certain way of looking at things, Sharpsburg became the tenth largest city in America, surpassing Buffalo, NY in population for that period of time!

80,000 soldiers had their needs, and that included wood for cooking and campfires. Entire woodlots went up in flames day by day, a tree at a time. The wooden fences has also mostly been knocked down. Even the ones that weren’t in the thick of the fighting were often knocked down simply because they were in the way. Farmers, of course build fences for a reason, and the end of the fences meant that livestock could start roaming free. That was fine by the soldiers. Although the soldiers were forbidden from stealing from the farmers, a chicken or swine that wandered into a camp full of hungry troops would probably not be seen again. Farmers like David Miller naturally resented the soldier’s continued presence, and described them as “two-legged-locusts”.

An Army of Germs was carried with the Army of the Potomac. Disease spread rapidly. Most of the armies on both sides were made up of country boys, and the army was the first time they were crowded together with city boys. Men from rural areas had much less immunity and were far more susceptible to contagious illness. Throughout the Civil War, sickness would kill 2 soldiers for every one who died in battle. Army camps were often lacking in even the most basic sanitation. The presence of the dirty army was a health threat to the residents of the area, and many got sick. David Miller’s brother Daniel became ill and died shortly after the battle.

The Miller House on top of the hill on the hiker’s side of the street was a witness to the battle. So too was the barn on the opposite side of the street. The other buildings were built later.

The hiking trail concludes by winding its way up to the north and northeast. It cuts through the North Woods, allowing the hiker to observe the growing young trees. The trail ends at Tour Stop 1.

Conclusion
The trail has cut through the scene of some of the worst fighting in US history. No man who fought through it and survived it would ever forget it. The Civil War had many battles, and many of those battles had landscapes that were named for the savagery of their fighting. Gettysburg had the Devil’s Den, The Wheatfield, The Peach Orchard Little Round Top, the Railway Cut, and The Angle. Fredericksburg had Marye’s Heights. Spotsylvania had The Bloody Angle. Shiloh had The Bloody Pond.

The Iron Brigade’s Major Rufus Dawes, a combat veteran of almost every battle fought by the Army of The Potomac, was traumatized by this combat more then any battle previous or following. It “surpassed anything, on any other battlefield of my observation …” The sanguine 1st Corps commander, Joseph Hooker agreed. “It was never my fortune to witness a more bloody, dismal battlefield.”

The Antietam National Battlefield has several other hiking trials, including the Sunken Road, Burnside’s Bridge, and The Final Attack trail

Hiking Tips # 2 -- Avoiding Toxic Relationships (with plants).

Poisonous plants are as common as they are irritating. The allergic reaction to Poison Ivy, Oak or Sumac can make a hiking trip memorable for the wrong reasons.

Plants of Poison
There are three major types of poisonous plants in North America, Poison Ivy, Oak and Sumac. All of them generate the same oil, called urushiol. About 70-85% of the population is allergic to it. All parts of each plant are poisonous- leaves, vines, berries, roots. The plants can't be trusted even when they're dead or dormant - a dead vine will still has the urushiol in it. Burning the plant is a bad idea- VERY bad. The smoke itself carries the urushiol molecules, and if inhaled, can cause the allergic reaction on the inside of a human's trachea and lungs. This can be fatal.

Once a person or animal has come into contact with these cursed weeds, the unfortunate has a mere 20 minutes or so to thoroughly wash and scrub down the affected body parts. After the 20 minutes, the oil has affixed itself to the skin, dried, and cannot be washed off (urushiol is non-water soluble).

For those of us who are allergic, the discomfort starts in but a few hours. First there's the itchy redness. Then the bumps. Then the blisters. The blisters will eventually break. It is of mild comfort that the fluid in the blisters does not actually spread the toxin. It sometimes seems that this is the case, when one part of the body has an immediate reaction, and an adjacent part has a delayed reaction. That's just because the first part to become symptomatic received a larger dose of the poison.

Clearly exposure to toxic plants is unpleasant. Happily, a savvy hiker can avoid said unpleasantness by knowing his or her way around the toxic plants. In these cases, an ounce of prevention is worth several pounds of cure -- and calamine lotion.


Know Thine Enemy
Americans have to worry about 3 different types of these wicked weeds - Poison Ivy, Poison Oak, and Poison Sumac.

Poison Ivy

The most common of the three, Poison Ivy is found in every state of the union west of the Rocky Mountains, except for North Dakota (lucky North Dakotians). It's appearance can vary, but the constant rule is that the leaves grow in clusters of three. Sometimes the leaves are all the same size, sometimes the middle one is larger, but there will always be three. Poison Ivy vines are have "hairs" on them. These traits have given rise to more then a few rhymes and mnemonics on identifying the evil plant. Among the most useful are "Leaves of Three - Let Them Be!" and "Hairy Vine, No Friend of Mine!"

Poison Oak

Common along the American south, Poison Oak comes in both Atlantic and Pacific flavors, neither enjoyable. The leaves are slightly different then the Poison Ivy - they look like Oak leaves, hence the name. Other then that the differences between Poison Oak and Ivy are slight. They both grow leaves in clusters of three, both have fuzzy vines, and are both to be avoided at all costs.

Poison Sumac



It's actually a tree. It's also by far the most toxic of the three, according to some botanists. It's leaves have no easily recognisable numerical pattern, growing in clusters of anywhere from 7-13 leaflets. This bad news is offset by good news - this hateful plant is only found in swamps and bogs. Why are you even hiking there in the first place?

Like groundhog holes, and broken bootlaces, poisonous plants are some of the irritating challenges any hiker has to get used too. Consider putting up with their existence as the fee we pay for an adventurous hike. Knowing just a bit about these pesky plants is more then enough to steer the hiker away from them and onto the more enjoyable things of the trip.